tv U.S.- North Korea Summit CSPAN May 7, 2018 8:59pm-11:30pm EDT
three days as the master of the house he can do whatever he wants and the other gives up his free will. that is the ultimate mastery. then three days later they go to the other house he is the master and chain gives up his free wil will. >> did it work? be make apparently. they have 21 children. >> good morning.
thank you for coming to our event it is a pleasure to cohost this conference he would like to think all distinguished speakers and guests coming today i have the honor of introducing our first speakers today. but before i do that i would like to mention a word about safety we do not expect any emergency situations to attract one -- arise but please you exit the building using the stairway using the national geographic building and we will give you further instructions. today and interactive session you each have received line
downstairs otherwise please go to the reception desk i would like to remind you about a few logistics please remember to turn these microphones on and off also please don't walk away they do have a tracking device. you won't get very far but they are expensive so remember to return them at the end of the session. now our first speaker is the president of the sis after he is finished we will have the current ambassador that to the united states here in washington d.c. first i will introduce ambassador joe very quickly prior to being appointed at distinct professor at the korea advanced institute of science and technology and professor emeritus cool of international studies with a long and
distinguished career having served as a south korean ambassador and economic advisor to the former president and also previously as the world bank and imf now we will have our first speaker come to the stage. [applause] >> good morning thank you for coming we are delighted to have you here. i'm a little worried i just came back last night from ten days in the serengeti so if i say stupid things i have a good excuse i still have jet lag. i am very excited to have you here today i cannot think of a more interesting topic. i remember in 1989 when the first president of the czech republic said you are moving so quickly we just don't have
time to be amazed and there is a little bit of that right now i think all of us are amazed at what has happened. and then talking in the green room the difference between the hopefulness in korea and skepticism in washington is a theme we will here today and that is part of the backdrop of what we share together with this sense of amazement and try to spend the day understanding what this means or where it can go are the implications as larger than just north korea and south korea and really that is at the core especially with very good people to explore the
topics to say my thanks to the ambassador who will be here with mayor barry timely and relevant experience in a conch you for the last 20 years. so with perfect interaction. so they probably don't understand those dynamics and important reason for americans today to listen very carefully so we can inform that thinking was that washington narrative which largely has been shaped by failed experiences and a formulation about what north the amazed camp with
skepticism but i need to come to my own views and thank you to the scholars that will be here to help us. ambassador cho looks pretty good for someone who hasn't slept in the last four weeks. constantly moving and when he first arrived he told me this was a time of potential great opportunity with his willingness to lean forward with sound personal risk and receive that amplifying in front of us that we are very fortunate that ambassador cho will be with us this morning to launch the conference so with your applause please welcome. [applause]
why look to you to continue to provide personally i was quite surprised how many to discuss the ending many of the younger generations were shocked to learn that the korean war was not in the past but it is time to turn the page with this world we must take a rare opportunity for it slips through our fingers. so today i understand it for
and for human rights issues at the state department. and through north korea policy is assistant secretary for korea with the state department. and fellow chair at csis former director for japan korea and of ayers thank you for being with us today. it has been ten days and a lot of things is going on in there is more to come i was not very sure so i have a different
>> what is your opinion? >> that if they have objectives it is a major step forward that certainly was not achieved that is a much more modest objective we need to begin a process to move us in that direction but probably yes they achieve that objective. >> what you think of their objective i think that they are correct that there is more objectives for this summit but
it was not revolutionary so the way that it was not to appear in the north korean newspapers and so i think that were they not satisfied with the outcome would have seemed very different and very different takes from what we saw. >> what do you think is the most important? >> so compared to the other panelist it is important to figure out what the objectives were and the unique thing about this particular summit it is an intermediate step
that we know there have been others but if we were looking at others he would be long-term. so with the near-term objective i would agree with what the audience suggest he did achieve those objectives so i would guess they had clear objectives to reduce tension on the pendant peninsula and serve in the theater over the next few weeks and also to establish a rapport with his largely unknown leader to the north so he achieve those objectives the north korea side has its own objective but in trying to
humanize the leader short-term objectives absolutely they achieve those but that will be a longer-term process. >> who achieved more? >> i completely agree with all of those that chose c and also doctor katz. so to have that feel into thousand and 2007. that also look at that reaction outside and in this instance and to have that
coverage that is unprecedented the leader and the first family and the wife and so it completely conveys to the nation he is changing direction. and to be successful to convey that through the international community. and i think for south korean it was an amazing opportunity and you've never seen it to that extent to see the young leader treat the south korean
president he is almost is uncle and to me would be the mission that it was so full that that the north korean leader that he better drive up there. that would be a way that you have never seen before. so the public reaction was euphoric and to judge by the reactions. ultimately this is a bit of a prelude between president
>> and it seems on teeniest and natural so long -- spontaneous and natural and also i enjoy watching the two leaders without the sound that you read their body language and also after reading each other for the first time in person. >> and to look at the leader that was very friendly forgetting what he had done mike shooting his own goal and then in his brother the half brother in the air force so
how do we digest that in a contradictory setting? >> that there was a greater sense of intimacy when you see the pictures and images are usually shown to a large crowd who are standing on top of the platform but this is a much more intimate picture it is just the two of them, they're holding hands, stepping back and forth, it is a very different image that we have seen in the past on his point of view because he tries to convey this idea that he is a person you could deal with so from that point of view yes.
>> we are in a position to answer that way i think we will say we will see. but if we put ourselves in another way it would be quite different so with those north koreans who are engaged but the spontaneity generates that comment and with the new outcome but with the theme of today's program that there is a healthy balance and even south korea that balances each other out but time will tell
there is a strategic change and to not use negotiations in the way that has been so. >> ambassador? >> a leader in his mid- 30s shows he wants to live and rule in comfort. and i think he does not realize that the only option for him to do that is to change the course. and to me, it reminds reminds me a little bit of his grandfather. and personally in 1984 i'm convinced he would have changed the course he had reached the deal and it was a
good framework and about to have the first ever summit and then he died. i think he realized after the cold war in the soviet union there was nothing coming from the russian side that this could not continue. but it did because he died and his son took over and i don't think his son was ever as confident as his father was and that being said, i do believe kim jung-un has three more decades to look forward to being young and this talk about wanting to be a normal country i don't think we should dismiss that out of
hand there is something to him to want to be a normal country and to be in charge of her normal country. >> but now having had a chance to talk with them at that time? over the south korean leader? delete -- do you think those things have changed? >> yes. i do think he is powerful enough and has so much respect not just north korea but south korea as well that i think he would have changed the course a lot more dramatically i
think the summit and of course coming from a conservative camp would have been much more successful. >> and ambassador king, how different do you think those tools are? >> so what is the most important is their experience. come june il had different kinds of experience. but the current leader was a child of privilege and corrupt and everything was given to him everybody respected him. he had no qualms one or two years after taking power to execute his uncle.
these are not reflective of the kind of behavior of a person who once to get along with other people. this is a person who is used to getting his own way and if he doesn't he throws a tantrum. now maybe he has reached the point where he can say i can't throw a tantrum and may be can't do that and he has to use more a more positive me to affect the change that he wants like economic development or lifting sanctions to move forward. he is a different person than his father and grandfather but to say that's positive i'm not sure we are there yet.
>> i'm not sure. there are things about kim jung-un especially with his grandfather quite literally he is modeled after him just as the way he does that is why he started to gain weight to look more like his grandfather. so that is sets in the direction that bv that the ambassador is correct he will be more open to change essentially. on the other hand he was selected by his father instead of his two brothers and that might lead us to think he was more hard-line and less flexible so perhaps more like came jong il then we suspect. but we just don't know.
i am an academic so my hypothesis is that when you are in trench relationship often if you don't have contact it self perpetuates that when you start to engage in contact it is easier to talk about real issues and substance. and regardless of personality so that will lead us to better understand the issues in front of us and come to terms again with these real issues that need to finding in spite of personalities. >> so do you think that gives him more of a chance to talk to the united states or south
>> 75% said it will happen in the next two years. ambassador king? >> you mean the summit? >> usually it is safest yes (whatever happened there is likely to be more than one that is taking place from the north and south there is a summit coming up but the other question go further that whether the summit actually produces anything and that is the real question. i don't see this as the second coming but there is a
possibility that things could work out. and the peace regime but depends what you mean. i think there is the provocation as they are willing to stage provocations when they are needed or that becomes the most difficult that i favor of all of the options i hope c -- c is not likely the others are but it is too early to start prognosticating about what will happen about additional meeting meetings. >> so how do you explain urinalysis? >> a couple of things that first i think we are in a unique moment with a time of
unpredictability with the two leaders are about to beat and that is an asset i would say the best way right now is to predict the most unpredictable outcome. [laughter] although in this case i hope not because war is clearly the least what we hope for that is the lowest but in terms of responding to these results or a hypothetical war how that could be different if they did not meet in the outcome to be different over the last couple of weeks or even the last year we were in a moment where we were hearing talk of war more than any other time. so this is hopeful.
it's helpful to me a lot of hope going into predictions and that's okay. because redesign the outcomes in many ways but it is a safe bet. >> it is just like again and again but we don't know what they are doing. >> eliciting more into the possibility over the next two years. >> i like me everything answers. [laughter] it is very likely there will be multiple summits and it is likely maybe not a provocation
for some sort of provocation that occurs and i think the new administration is very serious and i do think they have a very short timetable before that. i think perhaps in the united states we don't realize just how much of a roadmap has been laid out already and how high expectations are maybe not this year but i think they are anticipating within the next couple of years. >> and what do you think about the regime? didn't that peace regime? one is the peace declaration otherwise just to say i declare but actually to get to a piece treaty would be very complicated and much longer than two years.
but before this meeting or as it goes on you know the talking points of what to say after and if you have those exchanges or the kiss of death in everything we have a productive meeting then that's okay. if you say we have made great progress then it gets better and then of course he can tweet the best ever. [laughter] and then that's pretty good. i think i really cannot see as we saw anything but a good
meeting for anything that happens afterwards and let's be frank that there is nothing wrong with multiple summits. and it does keep certain diplomats employee. [laughter] that more than that it means they are talking and i think when you are talking you are learning and then to be reminded we were in a very, very different place in november or december of last year and we don't want to go back there. many don't want to go back there so i think this is a good development and if there
is more talk then that's fine. >> so what about the next ten years? >> the one thing that is the complicating factor is the north-south relationship is not isolated. and the biggest issue is what is the relationship of the united states and how does that devolve towards improvement? the one thing i think it is encouraging the presidents approach is popular in terms of working with the united states and comes to the united states the year after he was
officially inaugurated immediately after his summit with kim jung-un these were all very positive and he tried very hard to keep the united states onboard over the last two some this was not the case i remember sitting in the meeting regarding congress and this was one of the most difficult meetings i have ever seen members of congress have with a foreign leader. not just that they were of noxious because that is a given that there was a real clash in terms of what role the united states should play and the importance of the north and south issue. so on the korean side there is a real benefit to have the
sophistication of which he is approaching this issue. on the american side there is room for improvement but i think that will be the key in terms of how that relationship can evolv evolve. what about in ten years? >> if i may it is a process to discuss nuclearization is now 25 years old it has taken 25 years and quite clearly we have not succeeded in that is because of north korea's determination to get there and one aspect of this is that they have gotten there. and now they have nuclear devices that is worth
250 kilotons 15 times the size of the bomb dropped on hiroshima. but then in november practically can reach anywhere but we have to admit it is the difference between 25 years ago and now we have to admit the price is not and we cannot buy them off at the price we did with that framework so in that sense you are going to need many summits and meeting just to get to what they want. and if you believe the only risk that we want and that is a mistaken path.
exercises. so i think the summit is still the safe prediction. [laughter] clearly but one more note it is an easy answer but it is unique that is the modality and how those states in the region are being integrated so in the organic way maybe we don't know which sum we have tried a different path like a bilateral in the '90s and multilateral try to have everybody at the table with a multilateral arrangement.
so it is a tricky issue it isn't just the 2 liters multiple countries but then they will figure out to be a part of the process. so the interesting thing about the present moment is it seems inevitable that in some way the multiple countries that have a stake in this issue are going to get in on the action. so also letter a as well. >> while we do the six party talks a long time ago to say that is the only way to save the world. but now we talk about the summit but why has it changed so drastically? >> i think the president of
probably that six-party context to some extent russia but i'm not sure. you knows so moving on i think it will be interesting to see whether that changes a little bit for right now unquestionably the winners are north and south korea. >> d think it's by design or just happen that way? >> while i mean if the nuclear summit is held at the dmz there'll be a trilateral summit. i don't think that there's any doubt there can be a meeting that there will be a trilateral and counter so you know that's an easy thing to predict. if it's outside the dmz or the
korean peninsula it seems quite like he but i hope at some point china gets in on the scheme of things. it's the bit of a negative so they would want to rejuvenate. they have huge equity so they want to make their presence felt >> what is your answer to that question? >> i think it's very contingent. i think if and if it's a big if, if everything goes well with the united states more summits are likely and the prime minister our day has -- so we know that might be in the works but i do
think it's contingent on how things go with the united states bilateral. aside from that i think it's hard to talk about sanctions as though there until as though they are just one thing because unilateral sanctions by the united states are bigger thing than united nations sanctions even if south korea and china would seek sanctions relief from the u.s.. that would take a long time. it's a significant policy change since it's not something that will come quickly. particularly predisposed to give north korea the benefit of the doubt that it will make good at this point. so i'm much less convinced than many people in the audience that
even if -- whether or not they will get more than one. >> with regard to the six-party talks and the six-party structure i think we should not underestimate that. the six countries that are involved are six countries that have the most at stake in i don't know that we need to continue in exactly the same form but certainly involving in addition to north and south korea who obviously are the key to the whole thing you have to have the united states. you need to have china. you need to have japan. russia is more peripheral but it's help to have the russians involved so that you now i don't see two koreas in the united states playing well with the chinese or the japanese.
and i think there's going to be a success it needs to be a broader kind of framework. the other thing in terms of sanctions, the sanctions are largely united nations and the united nations structure has played a very important role in shaping the sanctions. and in making them more rightly international. so you can't ignore that element to it as well. think it's got to be broader and we have to be careful about excluding parties with a strong interest. >> maybe bilateral talks are easier to decide something. when there's six-party talks every day there's another round of meetings and there's not much
that changes after that. i have a thought that bilateral is easier. do you think south korea -- military exercises? >> the whole question of our presence in south korea i think on the one hand there are group of people who really do believe that north korea wants to talk and south korea. and i think apparently kim jong-un told president kim jae
-- moon jae-in that troops are wanted at the korean peninsula as well as to check on china. and so strategically i think there have been a lot of questions asked and for me i can't imagine that eventually and i think professor said this. i would imagine there will have to be questions on the two presidents. in south korea also there is a real group of progressives who do believe that koreans won't have sovereignty until their troops are in south korea. there's a need for many of us
that certainly china and possibly north korea will demand that there be no troops there so there is no question. it becomes a question within the united states. we have seen historically that has always been true. you remember jimmy carter wanted to remove the troop presence and also in the iraq afghanistan war they were very reset within washington to troop reduction. this is nothing new. i guessed the latest round has been triggered by a the trump administration saying that maybe the presence of the sma, we can think about scope and reducing
or withdrawing troops. so that you know, there is history and discussion over all of that but the reality i think is that the public on both sides of the pacific support, very strongly support troop presence on the korean president. in south korea you have about 70% who still support the u.s. troop presence. in the u.s. it is very strong so to me this kind of discussion will happen when we are looking at options and possibilities but it's not a discussion that is firmly founded in reality. >> we will ask questions and then we will move on to -- why are we moving towards the
eventual goal of denuclearization and do you think we need to touch upon the status of the u.s. talks in south korea? >> so yeah back to the question it's a really critical issue right now. him protecting what president moon might do, so far judging on his past record he's been very careful to coordinate that closely and pressuring the u.s.. we been coordinating very closely and very carefully. the interesting thing about this moment is the u.s. side. that's very new and certainly on the sma discussions president trump's seddon's campaign so the question of whether the u.s. would be willing to put that on the table. think ordering is critical. it's something that the united states has always been willing to consider that after certain
things happen and that on the ground can change. i think this is something that is agreeable with the south south korean public is well-paid there's a misconception to think certainly we have had our moments of anti-american sentiment and tragic incidents in terms of troops and south korea but generally there's the understanding of the true presence as long as things remain as they are in terms of keeping a deterrence. if there's a sense that the u.s. wants to get ahead of that i that would be something they discussed privately but that would be in some ways a complete reversal of what folks might think. >> thank you. now we will move on to the q&a session.
>> thank you very much. amer porter from hong kong tv. my question will be what world is china play in the denuclearization role after the summit between the unit -- united states and korea. would that lead to director in direct talks with the united states? >> whom do you want to answer. [inaudible] [laughter] >> what was the question? >> i think i alluded to this before, china is a major air with huge equity and i think you saw this before.
in fact kim jong-un met with either south korea or the u.s. leader and it's kind of interesting because according to north korea kim jong-un asks and beijing accepted. according to beijing they ask him just a kim jong-un going to come and he said no. it speaks volumes to their relationship. we know how much trade goes through there and clearly without the support of china north korea cannot survive. at the same time china needs is stable north korea that separate from south korea so i have no doubt that this relationship will continue. after the summit and a solution
to denuclearization has to involve china. i think we need strategically one of the key reasons why they are doing this is because china has prioritized denuclearization higher than before and prioritized instability the likelihood of instability and we saw that very clearly in china. virtually all of the u.n. security resolutions i think that is where the pressure has come from. china needs to play a bigger role after the summit. >> we are running out of time. we will ask questions together and answered together.
>> i just want to thank all the panelists for your insights today. he mentioned president moon acting as a coach regarding a coming summit with president trump it was your best guess on trump's tactics? >> i'm a korean analysts. president moon's top trump tips for tax pics. >> michael with the peace foundation. there's a lot of emphasis on the complete nuclearization and it's also in the declaration on the north korean side and end to hostile policy, u.s. hostile policy and security guarantees. ambassador joseph yun you said north korea has nuclear weapons.
how do you see them interpreting those two phrases, the security guarantees and that -- . >> one more question. >> hi i'm a student. my question is how does any progress in negotiations with north korea's founding narrative and it has to be stuck to the koran were. how can kim jong-un actually act against that? >> a tough question. it's a question no one can
answer. i think i'm coaching tips your guess is as good as mine. i think someone said there was announces. i have seen it yet. maybe someone else has. >> i think they will be letting him know the expert patients in washington and really how to deal with president trump in person. regarding the second question on security guarantees, quite frankly i don't know. it's a mystery to me. for me whenever i talk to north korea the problem they have is hostile policy. what do you mean by hostile
policy? for them it is everything. bob king worked for so long on human rights. why do you care and how about your human rights? they even complain. mark you are going to have to do something. it is why what we deed is kind of a trust or confidence. there is none now. the last question on the korean war and armistice and surprisingly a lot of koreans
don't know in america that there is not a peace treaty. it's more than just a treaty. which is why big it's going to take so long. how long does it take to get a treaty? about 19 years and there are many issues there. so i think it's going to be complicated. the big question of course is what comes first, the denuclearization or a peace treaty? for me it would be a real mistake to have the peace treaty come first and then denuclearization because that is clearly an open admission that you are saying that north korea has nuclear weapons. >> with regard to the question
are security guarantees and assurances that the united states might take that could ultimately lead to progress in this regard. the real difficulty is going to be the credibility that president trump brings to this discussion. we are in the process by the end of this week of having a decision on whether the united states is going to withdraw from the agreement on iraq and when you look at that issue in the context of north korea what assurances does north korea have or promise or insurance the agreement the united states makes will be carried out anything derailed difficulty the united states is going to have in terms of the role that a place in this process is what kind of assurances and what kind of form do those assurances take to convince the north koreans to begin the process moving towards
denuclearization. >> i echo that and just on the united states side in particular we believe are very underprepared and there is not a lot of history in this team that looks like we have diplomatically going forward. i would feel a lot more comfortable if we did have some experience diplomats working on the united states to have. i think the history is important and people who have experience dealing with the north koreans that they are familiar with are much more likely be treated as credible.
i think that's one piece of advice that i've might give. that's something i would recommend to the united states. >> in terms of advice to kim jong-un for dealing with president trump since we are better with readers we know what he said that but if i had been president moon i would encourage him to establish a rapport. even things like the symbolism of this visit that in some ways it's able to match is going to be a hard thing always jumping over the border and things to match that in some ways that sounds like it's making light of symmetry but it's quite important to ensure that we
don't reach a dead end and the course talking is not what anybody's interests and that to really have an abrupt and were not good chemistry between the leaders would be a loss for everyone at this stage. if i were president moon i think both leaders from what i understand can be quite cordial and quite charming in person and to think of ways to have a nice photo op and again not to make light of the photo op that is the foundation for the dialogue and for the process to take root. that very good and interesting question on the question of narrative. in some ways we are bound by the narrative that over time they produce but they can also be altered by leadership.
particularly the situation of the government. seen the new logos being reported to the north korean public. we might actually see and a hopeful sense and national narrative. >> thank you for sharing your intuition. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for this informative session. we will have our next panel.
>> there are obvious differences one of which is we are talking about this meeting that hasn't happened yet. not only has it not happened it has the bin been scheduled and we don't know where it's going to be. goes without saying there's a lot of unpredictability in the conversation we are about to have. i'm going to quickly introduce everybody and then make one very quick opening remark and got questions. i really don't need to introduce people because all of you know all of these people so i'll people so keep the very people so i'll keep it very sharper it's an all-star panel. starting at the other end mark lippert's ambassador to south korea serving president obama. next to him sheena grietens is a leading scholar on asia broadly but also on korea. next to her is victor cho who's almost ambassador to south korea. [laughter] and is at georgetown a wonderful university and also csis.
sue mi terry worked for the obama administration on asia issues is now the senior fellow at korea chair and lastly he worked in the george bush administration and is the senior vice president for asia csis and also works at georgetown. i'll they want to make one comment about donald trump which i do is my day job to set the tone for this conversation and that is i actually was on duty the night the donald trump accepted kim jong un's invitation to meet delivered by the south koreans. i think it's worth remembering and you probably it at the time but it's worth remembering exactly how it went down because it was not like any other white house. due to government representatives can came from south korea to brief the national security adviser about
their meeting with north korean officials. again what people assumed would be a collaborative process toward a decision on whether president trump would meet with the north koreans. they came to the white house on a thursday. they were supposed to see the president on the friday. he heard that they were in the national security adviser's office h.r. met mr.'s office and he said ring them into the oval office. the unexpectedly went into the oval office, sat down with the president and the number of his advisers so not his secretary of state and they have basically laid out the results of the meanings they have had with the north and said that they thought they would be having a meeting. the president said let's do it. these two gentlemen, i wasn't there to see it but my assumption was they were probably taken aback and president trump sing the national security adviser of
south korea you tell the president what's going to happen. he said i have to call my boss first. so trump turned to mcmaster and said take into your office and have them call the president. they go into my pastor's office and he calls the president and president moon says if that's what he wants we can go ahead with it and then the national security adviser comes out in a moment i'm sure he never expected and his entire career he walked out into it darkened white house driveway where there's a phalanx of cameras and reporters and announces president trump will be meeting with the president with the supreme leader of north korea, an announcement that was so unorthodox and so many levels you can't begin to think about it. a major policy announcement he made in the white house by another country's government. i only mention this because it's by way of pointing out the
obvious which is which early know very little about what's going to happen in the next couple of months i wanted to kind of plant that to set the tone. so why don't we go to the first question which actually is very appropriate to what i just said which is the following. will a summit between president trump and kim jong-un actually happen? yes, it will, know what wanted will it be postponed which is not quite the right question because we don't know when it's happening. the presumption is if it doesn't happen three weeks it'll happen six months or perhaps after that okay you can continue to respond but we know which way this is going. 81% say it's going to happen and
that's interesting because i'm not convinced if you talk to people inside the administration that they are as confident as 82% but why don't i start with mike because i think mike has talked to a couple of people recently. what is your sense of the level of confidence that this comes off? >> while the president appears to be preparing his speech and clearly wants to do this and it's popular with his base. it's become a talking point on "fox news" so there's a huge amount of momentum politically and from the president himself. ..
maybe to reflect a little bit on the equation he does appear not only receptive but eager to have this kind of conversation. is there anything you can conceive of that would get in the way of that and cause him to have second thoughts? >> as you think about this from the perspective and the agreement in and of itself is
something that he can go back and present to a domestic audience and talk about as a success in and of itself into politics that the leadership is earned for the country abroad, and though i would expect a summit with north korea seems as able to meet those internal objectives would probably be worthwhile to have com have, bue are also practical considerations depending on the except country and the number of locations that have been speculated on. and you mentioned the sort of security concern i imagine he has concerns of his own that will depend heavily on their own
relationship with whatever that takes place in and there are potential upside. i'm not sure there's a lot of downside unless there is a condition put emerged from any of the conversation around planning. >> maybe we can shift from where it happened. the president ha is intrigued wh the idea. some of his advisers are less in trade and have some reservations about it. looking at it from an american perspective for a moment if you were advising a former boss on a meeting like this, would you tell him to try to have a place like singapore or would you tell
him to surround himself with all of the symbolism? >> it's a great question. when you kick it around, and you are left with trying to figure out who do you want this in the framework and if you start with a question then you get into this system where the two of the four that are up there so perhaps if you want to use that frame you go to switzerland. absent that, the third country is the safest. singapore sounds pretty good, and mongolia is one. i know it sounds like it is off the table now but those are the two that if you were going to go to a third country and it was advisable, this is a judgment
call it feels a like something we've just done along the way. if it were me i would make the call and then over to a third country singapore mongolia. >> do you have a different perspective would it make sense? >> let's finish with the location. >> my first choice he seems to bike tlike to take the leaders . i think what he said makes a lot of sense on this question itself
to me so much diplomacy is about momentum so i feel like i've longer if he is in terms of the venue and the timing to materialize the more chance that it can be postponed or fall through. already over the weekend, we saw things like americans think it's because of the sanctions but it's not. if you like the longer it takes to materialize and the more the chance the momentum could fail and it might not even have been. >> i'm very certain thai am vere summit is going to happen. he wants to have a win and save as accomplished something no
other predecessor has accomplished. south korea, all this groundwork he think he decided he's going to meet them there is an agenda. we always talk about [inaudible] and the excellent diplomacy, but i think that he has to say that this is a path he's going to pursue a. one thing i think we do know he seems like a bold person. he is not an indecisive person.
>> the one thing i thought of in the most recent historical examples plus 2015 and the russian summit. we can attack all the differences and momentum and americans versus the russians but there did seem to be a lot of momentum and something in the system stops it. was it the lack of consolidation of power, was that people that hthe people that hemight embarre other reason but there is a mechanism that we need to focus on which is the longer this goes on the more it may rear its head in. >> president trump constantly talking about the sanctions, it
could get hi give him a little t negatively. i don't remove them if it happens to if it does what kobe on the table and go to the second question which is precisely that, ca in the u.s. d the dpr k. bridge differences? [laughter] they should take maybe office there because it would be more interesting. make sure to turn on some of you may be clicking without knowing. >> at the closer split, but the
majority is they will not be able to bridge differences in the definitions of denuclearization so let me throw it out and ask first about where the panelists land on this issue and if you accept the majority view then maybe describe this process we are about to embark on a. >> i'm pretty scared to call this a something the two countries will be able to reconcile. i think that both leaders think that they are legitimate or a large part of their legacy on the maximum claims that they are going to do.
so people often mention that nuclear weapons are in the constitution and in 2012 it is also just these extraordinary amounts of the narratives that have been devoted to him as the person abou above the program bo his culmination and the role that it plays in both status and sovereignty. the trump administration and any administration would have trouble saying it's okay if they keep the programs they've developed so i find it difficult no matter how much i have heard this, i think the conversation will probably start with other things that i see that as a fundamental compatibility. >> do you agree with that and if so, do you see a scenario where
we head into a process that ultimately brings us to disappoint but? >> this question in his speech and diabolical and full of tricks. to agree to a peace mechanism, sure with absolutely no agreement to bridge that, that's what it means. can the bridge any differences may be but i think you pretty much nailed it the definition and what i heard in the negotiations the definition is like the article six commitment people may not remember this but we committed to complete
abolition thinkers crossed behind her back and do new things they are putting on the table like no first use and transfer into the kind of things nuclear states that britain, france and the u.s. do so is intended to verify. i don't see anything new that seems denuclearization. on the other hand we heard that he's attracted to the model and i was in the administration that was the month they turned over everything and those of us that have been in the talks no verification even if something. ltd. has been excluding water of a rock so the gap is enormous but if they decide they want a summit without bridging the gap that is a scenario he can talk about that has implications. >> do you believe if it is serious about the denuclearization at the iaea in
the international community have capacity to verify clicks >> yes. i think they do a. there is a set of protocols they can follow. there's a program you can create a north korea so it's not a question of whether there is but it's can you ever become that you got it all and that is the hardest question to answer. in many ways a way of talking about turning over all their weapons and that's fine. but you cannot verify what they don't turn over and that is the big problem.
i don't know if it was a trick question -- [laughter] to me it comes down to the core question of whether this is a problem that you see as one that should be managed or one that can be sold and we are basically saying this is a problem that needs to be solved. that maybe our view and personally i think it is a love of sense but does everybody else feels the same way and i think it is an open question whether they feel the same way. do the chinese feel the same way, do they think it is something that can be managed can be fudge we fetch the definf little bit. >> i totally agree with.
we don't know how many of these things or where they are. they will allow us to go everywhere and it just doesn't make sense to. >> but discussion of this model i think the look at it and see success from the nonproliferation and national security standpoint. i think it's hard again if you were asking for their perspective to look at it as something successful especially when you have a group of people in power who believe that to survive they have to stay at the top of the system and that is and what happens, so if you look at what they have said the
lesson they took from it wasn't a positive step for the securi security, it's that it contributed to tha that denies. >> i'm glad you raised that because i want to mention the other nuclear deal on the table right now and i sense that there is a difference of opinion among the experts on this. if president trump walks away from the dl on may 12, does that raise a new hurdle and what they look at that as another reason to be cautious about these things or do you think he is too preoccupied with his own issues and doesn't think much about iran? >> i needed ti may have to put x view on this. i think that from the perspective of this
administration they would see it hurting their position because it would send a signal tha the t the deal is not good enough and they need to do their end in terms of how they would take it i don't think they would take it one way or another because they are different from any others that they possess nuclear weapons and said it wouldn't make a difference to them. >> interestingly and ironically the deals made have a higher chance because they can't imagine possibly anymore and it won't be a democrat or republican administration. it's taking a deal with this particular team.
the problem was you had a tough administration coming in and it's kind of an interesting perspective. >> the talks i toxins of 1.5 tat they talk about the most is not libya or iran. they want that level of the strategic alignment and they are never going to get it. very quickly, we talked about the view but the reality is i think that at most we will be talking about one slice of the program and i wouldn't be surprised if they put on the table something like shutting down the nuclear test site which is about to collapse anyway for this reason ballistic missile tests. we want a 60 solution that will
be three to 5% solution and the question is what's it for. they will put on the table things like peace mechanism for things that reduce the deterrence capability more than the threat but i think that's what it will come down to the. what are we willing to trade for it and is it politically sustainable and that's going to be a hard call people generally are not talking about. that is our goal that we are not going to get anywhere near that even in the best circumstances. >> do you share the general consensus or do you have a different view? >> on the comment in the other
element we haven't talked about his time with and it will be dispositive in how much of the program you need to get up and said that is critical. on the deal i am just of mixed minds. on the one hand you look at general hayden's comments where he says is the one deal on the positive side of the ledger in terms of nonproliferation he was in the chair and the asians for a lot period so i put weight on that and on the other hand where they see themselves different and this feels like they are setting themselves up while attempting to any soviet style negotiation. final point, if you talk to
people who follow this closely and tell you he had a ham sandwich for lunch so that tells you [laughter] , october reference. [laughter] the point they often say is there's no doubt they do monitor the landscape and they do react to that very closely so i put weight on that piece as well. >> let's move to the next question which is within two years which is most likely that the nuclear missile test and inconclusive negotiations and everyone gets a marriage for inconclusive negotiations. [laughter]
inconclusive negotiations as one of the previous panelists said wasn't the worst thing in the world but that is the case for -- mike laid out the case we are not going to get what he wants and what are we willing to take. is there a case for the more positive outcome? are we missing something by landing in the middle, and i wonder is there a case you can conceive of where this goes an unexpected direction and then wind up with this denuclearization and regime of some kind? >> one of the things you noted is we have little data on how they make decisions in the sense that unpredictability seems to be seems to be something these
readers provide so i think we have to acknowledge and have a fair amount of humility about protecting what's going to happen because they both see an opportunity to make a legacy and make history, an and the appealf that probably shouldn't be underestimated. i also think then the question is what does that produce. even if you take this analogy and just think about that process, nixon went to this moment the picture in february of 1972 the normalization happened in 79, that is a seven-year process with an administratiotheadministration e in the united states and there
is a lot of evidence, gave up its historical suggestion now maybe it wouldn't have happened if he were alive and driving that process. he had sort of contradictory incentives as far as the relationship which there is some comparison that can be made about the relationship in the united states so it isn't going to be a one summit process and it's important to have that expectation going in i don't think that these outcomes are mutually exclusive for the next two years or ten. i think that you could see a combination of two or three of these or what is more likely to be a ten-year process if there is success. if it's not a successful process, we will no sooner but i
think you are looking at something beyond that timeframe. >> the question i have on donald trump's horizon he's like a fake success he would like to be a candidate for a nobel peace prize. can he accomplish that and set in motion a long and difficult process with few visible signs along the way and is it sustainable for him domestically that he basically pocket all the benefits just by having the meeting and he can ride this out for as long as he needs or is there a potential problem down the road to send a quick things are working out flex >> there's a strong possibility of two different realities. on the one level he can't declare victory if he just introduces the negotiations and
the peace mechanism or the denuclearization of the peninsula. just starting that process would allow him to sustain a love of praise on the media like "the new york times" -- wait that's not it. [laughter] >> they think it's hard for the democratic party is in the midterms so that is sustainable as long as they don't do a nuclear test and they may get enough out of this to be disciplined. what does he get, china than 90% on the sanctions that is a huge amount of relief and if we are talking about peace mechanism i think the chinese back off so that's enough to keep him disciplined on the nuclear to
just keep pushing this means. another level i can see them implementing sanctions. we may have painted a split personality approach with politics sustaining it but strategically not that big of a change of the implement. that is probably the most likely outcome. i want to ask any of you for your insight into beyond the president who is emerging as the key person calling the shots on the policy and what implications does that have and the reason i ask that is a few days before he was named as the national security adviser he gave an interview on fox in which he
said the good thing about the meeting is that it will fail and it will fail quickly and it will shorten the amount of time between where we are now in our next step by which i think he meant a military confrontation. he's now the national security adviser. that doesn'advisor. that doesn't mean that the policy but by all accounts you have a fairly hawkish claim that. what sense do you have about how important it is in assessing how this might play out flex >> for all of the turbulence around this policy the past year and back and forth, they maneuvered themselves into an interesting position in that you have south korea in the middle of this and remember this is the first time that the south korean president at a summit so early
in his or her term and that bodes well for the possibility of the repeat summit if things go well so that's an interesting variable. beyond that, they've got this kind of hawkish line up. we don't know what the secretary said that on paper it seems hawkish to end up with the president who has been somewhat unpredictable so i would say they have themselves in a pretty interesting position going forward in the current team given where everything is to keep them in the meeting. you i want to hear from you because partly a few months ago you've expressed concerns publicly about some of the rhetoric that was coming out of the administration and certainly
isn't the rhetoric we are hearing today. our your doubts about that largely resolved or do you still think there is a danger? >> i still think there is a teacher if the summit fails when the negotiations that followed. that is by definition with the summit does if it gets success or fields then you've run out of diplomatic options by definition. you do have these two dynamics taking place and from what we can see, he is clearly the guy to set this all up and going forward. a member of this work within the government no one is going to stand in the way of the presidency the first is a big
process and loanprocess and i tt first meeting the north and south will want a number and when we talk to the officials, the thing most about this opening early on is that all of the channels that have been closed for decades they really value that so i think that they will be willing to have many interactions as they si we saide last panel contact is important. i think that he voted for sleeping and reluctant to be another one. that is in part because some other folks that know him and that's what we do for the first meeting with the other company to see can we work together and then they come in at the very end. once he does the first one it may be harder to do another one until he feels like they've reached a deal.
>> why don't we move onto the next question. we sort of anticipated this one a little bit in the conversation. if the summit fails, what will happen? nothing but the korean engagement will continue, and will the engagement also fail? >> a little more of a split decision, returned to the publications in the engagement will continue and i suppose both of those things could happen simultaneously. why don't i ask soon to jump in on this and play this out. do you think it could be a combination of the two that they keep talking but there's periodic friction?
often we also focus on this and i think we should think about the possibility of this catastrophic success is a responsibility to think about that because a lot of the focus is on this with a grand bargain. i didn't see it even has an option that coming in with what if we give up nuclear weapons for the peace treaty and i didn't even see peace treaty on the other side. >> one of the things that surprised me the most about how the story has unfolded is how ththey have been split despite being so forward leaning in his approach to it like he has
persuaded him to come along and take these risks and detects something the rest of us did end up having said that, how real is the risk as it plays out particularly if there is a sort of peace mechanism that we do find ourselves at odds with and how were yohandheld real of a r? >> coming into this air of trump everybody predicted that risks, explosions, and we are not there. i thought it would be better than catastrophic failure of the alliance of people called for and the reason i thought is the first public opinion has moved dramatically to the center over the last 20 years and i think it is an influence that is pervasive in.
second, they largely learned the lessons of the past. it's managed very much from the middle. the other thing that is different is if you believe the recounts and the chatter both the north and south realized the need trealize theyneed the u.s.. so if you keep the talks going and both sides agree they need the u.s. than they are both likely to undertake actions to keep the channel. i'm not saying it's going to happen but it does feel different and it felt a little more nationalistic and maybe if the u.s. comes in, that's great and the six party talks are kind
over here to stand and this feels closer to that creates a dynamic that we will have to watch and see how this plays o out. >> it's also possible that if the summit fails the agreement could continue but they could choose to just say we are getting along just fine. one of the things about pulling the u.s. and it's different this time is in the past and mike renders this while when we haved the last government in south korea they would see that they were doing things and these othein these otherareas have sor unwritten way to elicit cooperation so one of the more obvious examples and this is clear that decision to send troops to iraq.
i don't see those other issues in the alliance today. it's about this issue and up until a few weeks ago because of trade. you don't have that broad spectrum of the issues in which they can call each other in and that worries me. >> you said before you thought about a job working to having you worried it was going to coincide with these tough negotiations on the truths and it looks like those are going to be really tough. the trump administration basically seems to be saying pay for everything. how big an impact does that have on the alliance and is it possible to compartmentalize that or is it part of the same conversation? >> under normal circumstances it
is very scratchy because it is about money and remember when they would say they have to raise an important issue because we knew in the end it would get resolved and it could become compartmentalized mcompartmentan is that it might not be a. some people could say this is a 1 trillion-dollar bill. and your article last week i think showed this isn't something we can't say isn't a possible scenario so there's a little bit about that as well.
>> first day of debate could own the pentagon an and state side u havstateside havean idea where n the band of the possible and i think if there is a common understanding heading into the negotiation of their you will end up, the negotiation will still be terribly scratchy as it always is because the fight over small things in these negotiations because it is truly zero-sum, but it can get to the point where it is hard to contain the outside political process is a little bit of interaction but not enough that it tends to get results that way. the final point is that it does not contain and it does bleed over and what makes it hard is as i mentioned earlier, it is a kind of zero-sum if there is a member and that is the percentage if you can fudge it a little bit on extra things, but that is what makes this hard and
potentially combustible. >> the other thing is that it tends to be worked out at a more working level is relatively rare for a cabinet official let alone a president to make comments on the specific at least when i think about the alliance. i don't know if it is different in japan that one of the things that has been different from relatively early is that the president has made comments about this and this is something he thinks abou of as a metric oe successful relationship in his mind and regardless what the rest of us in the room think it could have the potential to to
drive the process in a way that would make it difficult and he can sewecan see from what he sae potential exists but i don't think wknow whether he's going e the choice to get involved or to comment. >> it's interesting you mentioned japan. it's a way to come up with some new packaging but there's another problem here that concerns me. i don't hear in the way that they framed their approach to the problem and deep understanding of how much the longer-term issue and the immediate threat or into related
but i believe he gets leverage on the problem when they say the alliances are getting stronger that is an important sense of leverage and i also think that we get leverage on the long-term side. if you listen to what people are saying there's an awful lot of focus on reducing the threat to us but there's not a lot about the allies. when we were in the preventive war phase there wasn't a whole lot of thought so at the peace mode or more byte if maybe, i dt want to overstate there may be an underlying theme.
it's not just this sort of transactional thing you use. listening to debate about this in the administration not totally confident on the peace that they focus on. >> should we do that or just go to the four? [inaudible] why don't you post on the last question minimal concession that they would want that president trump would agree to and we can use that to a to go into the. okay, lifting sanctions, 29%,
51% so slight majority for security issues in this. >> in the negotiating day for minimal. [laughter] the gentleman right there please identify yourself and ask your question. >> independent consultant. it seems there is something missing in the historical perspective that the changes you can say there'you say there's ag but i'm going to stop it because it is definitely coming. or the emotion that is sweeping
yes it is a euphoria and you could say we don't want to get carried away by a motion but the question is can you view this as the past historical changes that this find something underlining is taking place that basically isn't going to be stopped. nobody seems to discuss that there might be a major change in the technological development that seems to be left out of the whole discussion of kissinger were here that is what he would be talking about. >> we are embarking on a new era of. i think everybody in the room would hope that that is the case. this is a leader in north korea who finally decided that i think joe said in the last panel he's got nowhere else to maneuver.
people hope that is the case. the empirical record has not been very encouraging. having said that, i just came back from a meeting in london where for the first time they were on the agenda and i was talking to a fellow that said that experiences are not comparable. i said [inaudible] it's only important in one respect and i said with respect. he said the main thing is a feat unimaginable can happen and so, maybe the unimaginable can happen. i think that he's a disservice
to his son to some degree. even if he were to make a strategic move in a different path i think that there will be challenges down the road because once we get momentum out of this is going to be able to changes in the. the. is he ready for that kind of change to take them in a different direction. >> the gentle man the food for. >> we know that rockets and nuclear weapons on the agenda. such of the following four might also make it onto the?
the global hacking conflux that is located on the chinese territory, the biological weapons, the chemical weapons or the georgia camps. >> would you like to direct this to? >> they should all be on the table in my view. it doesn't mean you try to resolve them all but if they are going to matter somewhere down the road diplomatically it's better to get them on the table early. i can't imagine them not to putting cyber on the table. it doesn't seem to be a priority for this administration and i think it would be a mistake not to include it in some form because it was better to watch
to the american people and south koreans, japanese have lost people to a productio eduction. >> think that will be a very sensitive topic [inaudible] can i just say one thing. the other part is how you think that policy will continue to be under the administration. this is also a president that meant and made a fairly big deal in his home state of the state about the story of the north korean refugees so i think that they laid out some groundwork
and i'm similarly skeptical because there are issues that can be concerned as direct const national security threats to the united states but there's also been a little bit of a creation of the beginning of the discussion of that or at least the potentially hard-line position that could affect the backend of this or the fact that trump himself has personally drawn attention to these issues in his time. >> it could show up in other ways like for example i as the process moves forward there will be some demand for sanctions relief and the initial way of doing that is to enlarge the humanitarian carveout under the current sanctions protocol so
that may be one of the ways you try to open the discussion that there's human rights and also humanitarian issues so we could see it coming to play. >> if it contains 36 references to human rights including provisions for mandatory designations, so if congress wants, part of what has happened is in the un and u.s. law that wall has become a headed in the to severe is superiors the stay authority to push back if congress chooses to do so. it creates a different foundation then we had under any previous discussion with north korea for a congressional role in controlling the sanctions. >> which is why they don't have it on the table.
>> five seconds due to the good work of ambassador king and others it's not ingrained in the federal separate as well. >> ththe time for one last question and then we will wrap it up. >> this is kind of a far off scenario but what about the model of accepting power different from how we've actually don't put it i that ine past? >> i've worked on that and it's not going to happen. we are not cooperating with them on these nuclear energies. we just don't give them a hard time. i don't think they are going to get that either. >> our response was when you become the largest democracy in
a look at efforts to promote islam as a religion of peace and what's being done to combat extremist radical ideology held by the washington institute for near east peace, this is a little more than an hour. [inaudible conversations] hello, everyone. good evening, everyone. i am president of the washington institute. [applause] but we begin by thanking my good friend for his outstanding service as president and chairman of the institute. [applause]